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Multiple viewpoints have been expressed regarding the principle nulla poena sine lege (there 
exists no punishment without a pre-existing penal law). Some scholars advocate the inviolability of 
this maxim because it safeguards personal freedom—an opportunity to do everything not prohibited 
by law. However, its critics assert that rigid adherence to the principle nulla poena sine lege may do 
more harm than good. They argue that the maxim, while prohibiting judges from punishing non-
criminal acts, makes it impossible for courts to deter them in a timely manner, which, in certain 
cases, may have a detrimental effect on society. To determine the correct approach to nulla poena 
sine lege, the paper considers its history in continental criminal law and then analyses the principle 
theoretically. The examination reveals that two contradictory interests—the need to safeguard 
personal freedom and the need to combat lawful, yet socially harmful, acts through judicial 
punishment—cannot be completely ignored in practice. Therefore, the findings suggest a balancing 
between these interests and propose a way to achieve this compromise. 
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This article proceeds as follows. Section 1 explores legislative acts and judicial practice of 
various European countries concerning the punishment for acts which were not explicitly 
criminalised at the time of commission. Section 2 provides theoretical analysis of different 
approaches which are adopted in these acts and practice. Finally, the paper ends with a conclusion 
in which the correct approach is suggested. 
In the early modern period, a number of European statutes authorised courts to punish acts 
which were not expressly crimilised by the sovereign. Among these laws were, for instance, 
Halsgerichtsordnungen für Tirol (1499)1 and Österreich unter der Enns Landgerichtsordnung 
(1514).
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Often the judicial practice concerning the application of these laws was arbitrary.
3
 In order 
to restrain the abuse of powers by the judiciary, Bambergensis (1507), Brandenburgensis (1516), 
and the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina (1532) imposed a duty on judges to submit a case not 
specified by the criminal law to a legislative organ and to enquire how it should be solved.
4
 This 
procedure, however, was regularly ignored and achieved no considerable success.
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In the 18th century, one can still find enactments authorising courts to penalise acts which 
were not explicitly criminalised at the time of commission. These were, for example, the 1721 
Prussian Code, the 1751 Bavarian Code, and the 1769 Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana.
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With the advent of the Age of Enlightenment, some prominent political scholars and 
philosophers took a firm stand against the wide discretion of the judiciary. With this regard, the 
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names of C.-L. de Montesquieu and C. Beccaria are often cited.
7
 They proposed to dramatically 
limit the competence of courts and to reduce their powers to the mere application of the law.
8
 
Soon these ideas found their way into legislative acts. In 1787, the Holy Roman Emperor, 
Joseph II, influenced by the enlightenment beliefs,
9
 enacted the Penal Code of Austria. Its part I § 1 
provides as follows: “Only those illegal acts are to be considered and treated as crimes which have 
been declared to be as such by the present law.”10 
It is generally accepted
11
 that this article was the first to adopt the principle which was later 
expressed by P. J. A. v. Feuerbach in a Latin formula ‘nulla poena sine lege’: no penalty without a 
law.
12
 Later similar provisions were incorporated in the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civil 
Rights (art. 7 and 8),
13
 the 1794 Prussian Law (title 20, part II, § 2),14 the 1810 French Criminal 
Code (art. 10),
15
 the 1813 Bavarian Penal Code (art. 1),
16
 the 1851 Prussian Penal Code
17
 and the 
1871 German Penal Code (§ 2, par. 1).18 
Although the punishment for non-criminal acts was forbidden, it did not, as E. Ehrlich 
concluded,
19
 cease to exist in legal practice. To quote I. Anosov, “If we turn to practice, we will see, 
as one would expect, that this maxim [nulla poena sine lege], this axiom of the modern criminal 
law, was violated when it was (or appeared to be) favourable or necessary. The idea that not all 
crimes are listed in criminal codes governs the practice.”20 
The words of E. Ehrlich and I. Anosov can be confirmed by a classic illustration: the 
unauthorised appropriation of electricity. At first, it was not prohibited by criminal codes as the 
legislators simply did not foresee the possibility of this act. Nevertheless, judges in the 
Netherlands
21
 and France
22
 meted out punishment for it. 
The same approach was adopted by courts in Bavaria: on 15 January 1895, the 
Oberlandsgericht (Higher Regional Court) Munich reached a guilty verdict on this matter.
23
 
By contrast, on 1 May 1899, the Supreme Court of the German Reich held that “the unauthorized 
tapping of an electric power line did not constitute theft.”24 This way of dealing with the 
unauthorised appropriation of electricity was also employed in Switzerland.
25
 However, in some 
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other cases
26
 German courts did not hold to the legally accepted maxim nulla poena sine lege which 
Germany, along with three other mentioned countries, incorporated in its criminal law.
27
 
The similar practice can be observed in the Russian Empire. Article 771 of the 1864 Statute 
of the Criminal Procedure declared that “the court shall acquit the accused if an act he was charged 
with is not prohibited by laws under the threat of punishment.”28 Despite this provision, in 1868, the 
Governing Senate, the Supreme Court of the Russian Empire, ruled that “an act, though not 
prohibited by any article of the law, can be punished if acceptance of this act may lead to serious 
abuse.”29 In other words, in some circumstances judges did not adhere to the legal principle nulla 
poena sine lege. 
In the 20th century, it was, however, abolished in several countries.
30
 For instance, in the 
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and later in the USSR courts were authorised to 
penalise acts which were not specified by the law. In this regard, article 6 of the 1922 Criminal 
Code of the RSFSR defined crime as “any socially dangerous conduct or omission posing a threat 
to underlying principles of the soviet state and legal order established by the power of industrial 
workers and peasants for the transitional period to the communist order.”31 The definition 
corresponded with article 10 of the same code which declared that “when there are no direct 
references to particular crimes in the criminal code, penalties or means of social defence shall be 
applied according to the provisions of the criminal code which provide for crimes which are the 
most similar in their importance and their kind, in compliance with the rules of the general part of 
the code.”32 
This rule in a slightly different wording was transferred into article 16 of the 1926 Criminal 
Code of the RSFSR.
33
 It is worth noting that its application was widespread. For example, in 1939, 
a group of scholars came to conclusion that in twenty months, the courts of Moscow region and the 
Moscow City Court have applied fifty-three provisions, which made up one third of the articles of 
the special part of the code, in accordance with its article 16.
34
 This practice was condemned as 
“dangerous and politically harmful.”35 Another team of researchers asserted that the application of 
article 16 was “occasionally coupled with the outrageous perversion of the socialist criminal law.”36 
In 1958, the maxim nulla poena sine lege entered into article 7 of the 1958 Basic Principles 
of the Criminal Legislature of the USSR and Union Republics.
37
 However, as M. A. Kaufman 
maintains, judges continued to punish non-criminal conduct, but they ably camouflaged this 
practice.
38
 
On 28 June 1935, the 1871 German Penal Code was amended to permit judges to mete out 
punishment for acts which were not specified in it.
39
 Nevertheless, in the Third Reich the use of this 
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possibility was not excessive.
40
 It may be speculated that this is probably so because “legislation 
could be enacted with lightning speed since the Fuehrer had unlimited legislative power.”41 In 
addition, “from the beginning those who were considered of real danger to the regime were dealt 
with by methods other than the criminal law.”42 The amendment was abolished on 31 January 
1946.
43
 
The brief historical analysis presents two legislative approaches: the maxim nulla poena sine 
lege can be either accepted or denied by the sovereign. The second option implies not only the 
legislative rejection of the principle, but also the sovereign’s tacit consent to judicial violation of the 
principle when it is declared to be legally binding. 
These two approaches are based on different theoretical concepts. Scholars advocating the 
maxim nulla poena sine lege stress the inviolability of civil freedom. The latter can be conceived of 
as “an opportunity to do everything which is not prohibited by the law.”44 Its paramount importance 
was expressed by V. Spasovich as follows: “Harm caused by a villainy committed with impunity as 
it was omitted by the law cannot be compared with terrible damage produced by the punishment 
without legitimate grounds and with the restriction of civil freedom which results from it.”45 
On the other hand, researchers who defend the opposite approach argue that due to this 
maxim acts which are not criminal but at the same time detrimental to society and present the risk 
of disorder for the state cannot be punished and in this way prevented in a timely manner.
46
 It is 
therefore not surprising that F. Liszt described a criminal code which adopts this maxim as the 
“magna charta of the delinquent.”47 
According to P. Danckert, these two approaches were thoroughly discussed in the draft of 
the 1851 Prussian Penal Code.
48
 As a result, the principle nulla poena sine lege prevailed.
49
 At the 
present time, its primacy is recognised virtually all over the world: the maxim is embodied in 
article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
50
 and article 15 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
51
 
Under these circumstances, judges are legally obliged to punish only those acts which were 
declared to be criminal at the time of commission. Nevertheless, rigid adherence to the maxim nulla 
poena sine lege appears to do more harm than good. This conclusion is based, in particular, on the 
considerations of J. Locke and R. Jhering. 
In his work ‘Two Treatises of Government,’ J. Locke argued, “Where the legislative and 
executive power are in distinct hands … there the good of the society requires, that several things 
should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power: for the legislators not being able 
to foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the 
laws having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make use of it for 
the good of the society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no direction, till the 
legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the law 
can by no means provide for; and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the 
executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require: 
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nay, it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power, or 
rather to this fundamental law of nature and government, viz. That as much as may be all the 
members of the society are to be preserved: for since many accidents may happen, wherein a strict 
and rigid observation of the laws may do harm … This power to act according to discretion, for the 
public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is 
called prerogative: for since in some governments the law-making power is not always in being, 
and is usually too numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because 
also it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may 
concern the public, or to make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible 
rigour, on all occasions, and upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a 
latitude left to the executive power, to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe. 
This power, whilst employed for the benefit of the community, and suitably to the trust and ends of 
the government, is undoubted prerogative, and never is questioned.”52 
Similar ideas were formulated by R. Jhering. As he maintained, “Law exists for the sake of 
society, not society for the sake of law. Hence, it follows that when in cases … the relations are 
such that the government finds itself facing the alternatives of sacrificing either the law or society, it 
is not merely empowered, but in duty bound, to sacrifice law and save society. For higher than the 
law which it violates stands the consideration for the preservation of society, in the service of which 
all laws must stand.”53 
The cited arguments lend support for the view that the legal principle nulla poena sine lege 
can be neglected. However, they differ in one respect. Whereas R. Jhering maintained that the law 
should be sacrificed only “for the preservation of society,” that is when a non-criminal act poses a 
serious threat to it, J. Locke argued that the executive power is authorised to act against the law “for 
the public good.” Consequently, according to the latter opinion, judges are empowered by 
prerogative to neglect the maxim nulla poena sine lege not only in cases when non-criminal conduct 
presents a grave danger to society, but also when the benefit of the community brought by non-
observance of the principle greatly outweighs the harm inflicted by its infringement. 
Considering the aim of ensuring the good of the society, it is to conclude that J. Locke’s 
stance is the correct one. Moreover, this view was often adopted by the judiciary. A case concerning 
the unauthorised appropriation of the electricity is a good example here. In addition, the Nuremberg 
Tribunals diluted the rigidity of the maxim nulla poena sine lege, even though it “was recognized at 
this time as a general principle of criminal law and a principle of justice.”54 
However, the breach of legality caused by the violation of this legal maxim is always 
detrimental to society as its people may follow the example of judges. As R. Pound put it, “If the 
courts do not respect the law, who will?”55 
It is necessary therefore to camouflage the breach of legality. One of the possible methods 
for achieving this goal is the employment of a so-called creative legal fiction. It is “an assumption 
which conceals or attempts to conceal the fact that under the guise of application of a legal rule a 
certain state body formulates and implements a ruling which cannot be derived from this legal 
rule.”56 
A creative legal fiction is used when a judge, for example, while punishing non-criminal 
conduct states that he applies an existing legal rule to reach a guilty verdict. This way camouflages 
the breach of legitimacy behind a veil of legal application and gives an impression, though a false 
one, that a court’s decision is legally justified. 
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For instance, in 1921, this method was used by the Dutch Supreme Court in a case 
concerning the unauthorised appropriation of electricity. To punish this non-criminal act, the court 
resorted to article 310 of the penal code. This provision “dated from a time – 1881 – that no 
legislator had ever thought of the possibility of stealing something immaterial like energy”57 and 
referred therefore only to a tangible object. Nevertheless, the court held that electricity is similar to 
“tangible property” and applied article 310 of the penal code to arrive to a guilty verdict.58 
The findings of this paper reinforce the view that non-criminal acts should be punished by 
courts when the benefit of the community brought by the violation of the legal principle nulla poena 
sine lege greatly outweighs the harm inflicted by its infringement. In this case, however, creative 
legal fictions should be employed to conceal the breach of legality. 
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